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Abstract— Architectures for next-generation modular instru-
mentation standards should aim to meet a requirement of 
High Availability, or robustness against system failure. This is 
particularly important for experiments both large and small 
mounted on production accelerators and light sources. New 
standards should be based on architectures that (1) are modu-
lar in both hardware and software for ease in repair and up-
grade; (2) include inherent redundancy at internal module, 
module assembly and system levels; (3) include modern high 
speed serial inter-module communications with robust noise-
immune protocols; and (4) include highly intelligent diagnos-
tics and board-management subsystems that can predict im-
pending failure and invoke evasive strategies. The simple de-
sign principles lead to fail-soft systems that can be applied to 
any type of electronics system, from modular instruments to 
large power supplies to pulsed power modulators to entire 
accelerator systems. The existing standards in use are briefly 
reviewed and compared against a new commercial standard 
which suggests a powerful model for future laboratory stan-
dard developments. The past successes of undertaking such 
projects through inter-laboratory engineering-physics col-
laborations will be briefly summarized. 
 
Index Terms—Instrument Modules, Data Acquisition, Accelerator 
Measurement and Control, Modular Design, Machine Availability. 
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I. MOTIVATION FOR DESIGN FOR HIGH 
AVAILABILITY 
High Availability design requires analyzing the reliability-
availability of each subsystem in view of the selected overall 
systems availability goal and a strategy developed for imple-
mentation. This is most crucial in large expensive enterprises 
where the cost of lost production (“Opportunity Cost”) is pro-
hibitive1. The problem is more severe the larger and more 
complex the machine. If efficient solutions can be found for 
the largest machines, then the by-product subsystems can be 
useful and cost-effective in smaller machines and experiments 
as well. Therefore the cost impact of new development can be 
easily justified for a large machine and the benefits reaped by 
the experimental community as a whole. This in fact was the 
 
1 Larsen, R.S. and Downing, R.W., Electronics Packaging Issues for Future 
Accelerators and Experiments, Paper NS-24, IEEE 2004 Nuclear Science 
Symposium, Rome. 
impetus for past standards developments. The current proposal 
for a large new machine, the ILC, gives the entire scientific 
instrument community a unique fortuitous opportunity to 
make a quantum leap in instrument and system design that 
will serve the next generation of experiments and machines 
both large and small. It should also offer a platform to which 
existing valuable instrumentation designs can be easily ported. 
The standards of the past grew from the bottom up as new 
electronic devices became available. Today, the urgent driving 
force needed for the next generation of standards is to take 
advantage of the spectacular advances of the last decade in on-
chip processing, analysis, memory and high speed communi-
cations transceivers and media including fiber and wireless. 
II. A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO HIGH AVILABILITY DESIGN 
The principles of HA design are simple. Every unit in a sys-
tem has an MTBF, Mean Time Before Failure, also called 
Reliability. The unit can be a resistor, a computer or a power 
supply or a whole subsystem. The MTBF of a machine is the 
product of the MTBF’s of its component parts. Another sim-
ple parameter is MTTR, the mean time to repair a failed com-
ponent that is interrupting operation. Availability, the parame-
ter if interest, is the proportion of time that an entire machine, 
or machine plus experiment, is actually operating correctly, 
compared with the planned time of operation, and its maxi-
mum is 100% or A=1. Simply, Availability A= (MTBF-
MTTR)/MTBF.  
It is important to think of large scientific machines as pro-
duction plants like an electric power plant or a refinery, with a 
desired Availability goal of A approaching 1. Typical high 
energy physics machines today operate with A’s of around 
50% of calendar time, while light sources (much smaller ma-
chines with commercial customers) would not stay in business 
without A’s of 0.95 or more. None of these older machines 
were designed with HA as the chief goal; they were most 
commonly designed for lowest cost with a still acceptable up 
time, often with serious compromises to availability (insuffi-
cient spares and maintenance coverage, long cool-down and 
MTTR, for example).  
 
Figs. 1 and 2 depict a 3-level controls and instrumentation 
system for a large accelerator or experiment. At Level 1 is the 
centralized control room or data acquisition computer com-
plex consisting of a large farm and associated interfaces. At 
Level 2 are the node control elements providing processing 
and links to controls and data acquisition elements for a sector 
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of a machine or a subsystem of a large detector. At Level 3 are 
the front-end modules, which gather and process raw machine 
or experimental data and receive controls and calibration in-
struction from the Level 1 via the node concentrators at Level 
2. All communications are based on dual star topology except 
that additional mesh elements are easy to add as well. Fig. 1 
shows this possibility.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Level 1 Central Control Computer Topology 
 
 
Fig. 2. Level 2 Sector Nodes & Level 3 Standalone Front-End 
Module DAQ and Control 
 
The most basic elements along an accelerator are stand-
alone modules near the signal source serving a dedicated pur-
pose, such as detecting and processing signals from a single 
beam position monitor, RF pickup (fast data) or a vacuum 
pump or magnet mover (slow data). All data are assumed to 
be digitized at the front end. Communication links also carry 
precise clock and timing information, as well as high and low-
speed data for data and controls respectively. For pulsed ma-
chines timing signals with a resolution of about 10 nanosec-
onds can be carried with the control data, but higher precision 
data is carried on a dedicated temperature compensated star 
fiber network. The control data protocols are designed to be 
robust and noise-immune. 
 
In terms of Availability, the larger the complex, the higher 
the risk that failures will occur so frequently that repairs can-
not keep up and A→ 0. For example, with 1000 power sup-
plies in a system each with a MTBF of 50,000 hours and re-
placement time averaging 2 hours, failures would occur about 
every 50 hours and the 2 hour repair would drop Availability 
from that one subsystem alone to A= 0.96. With 10 such sub-
systems, the average Availability of a major system (e.g. li-
nac) would be 0.67, and with 16 such systems making up a 
large machine like the ILC, A (full system) would be .0016 or 
practically zero.  
 
Of course the reason that large machines are able to run to-
day is that critical components, instruments and systems are 
designed with some redundancy features to minimize MTTR. 
For example, control computers in critical applications are 
either fully redundant or 1/N redundant, where an extra proc-
essor among a group of N can carry the load if one unit should 
fail, or carry the load with degraded performance if the main 
system should fail. The RF power stations in a linac or storage 
ring often have 1/N redundancy so operation can continue 
with one (or more) units failed. In the case of the linac, there 
must be sufficient spare stations to maintain the beam energy; 
while in a storage ring the current can reduced to keep operat-
ing when a single RF station fails. In the controls and instru-
mentation areas, quickly interchangeable standard instrument 
modules have had enormous benefit in reducing MTTR and 
raising Availability. However, most critical power compo-
nents below the systems level, with the exception of instru-
ment modules at the crate level, have not been designed to HA 
principles and therefore pose a risk to overall Availability. 
This leaves an enormous number of components in a typical 
machine as sources of “Single Point Failures” in which the 
failure of a single element brings down the entire machine. 
Examples are non-redundant power supplies, modulators, con-
trollers, timing modules and links, machine protection systems 
and beam sources. The goal of HA design is to effectively 
eliminate the impact of single point failures by a combination 
of imbedded intelligence quickly detect failure or impending 
failure, built-in unit redundancy, non-invasive replacement/ 
repair strategies, and system level redundancy for critical 
components such as klystrons which have a known low 
MTBF.  
III. CHOOSING AN AVAILABILITY GOAL 
Taking the example of the ILC, 16 Systems, each with an 
Availability that is the product of an assumed 10 subsystems, 
make up the full system, to which is assigned an Availability 
goal of A ≥ 0.99. The required average Subsystem Availabil-
ity needed to achieve the full system Availability of A ≥ 0.99 
is between four and five 9’s, as shown in Fig. 3. As will be 
seen, the choice of a goal is arbitrary, and once chosen, the 
subsystem performance requirements are dictated. Obviously 
these are averages; not all subsystems will behave equally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. A Full System vs. A Subsystem for ILC 
 (160 Subsystems) 
IV. BASIC STRATEGIES OF HIGH AVAILBILITY DESIGN 
The basic strategies are summarized: 
 
Every Unit, from instrument module to computer to power 
modulator or power supply, should include 1/N redundancy in 
a quickly replaceable modular design. 
Every critical data or timing link should have an available 
redundant path with automatic switchover capability. 
Every Subsystem assembly where multiple components 
cluster, such as an instrument crate or a multi-board solid state 
modulator, should have imbedded intelligence to detect and 
locally respond to internal failures such as  
Re-route data or power flow around a failed module or 
channel,  
Automatically power down a failed module for removal 
without interrupting operation of the shelf or crate, and  
Automatically notify main control of any internal failure so 
maintenance can be prioritized. 
Every Subsystem should have 1/N redundancy so an entire 
unit can be taken off-line and replaced without interrupting 
machine operation. 
 
Obviously, full dual or triple redundancy of all systems 
would double or triple basic costs, which would be impracti-
cal. However it is unnecessary, because 1/N redundancy cou-
pled with other strategies will be more effective in cost-
performance. 
V. SPECIFIC STRATEGIES FOR HA DESIGN 
Referring to Figs. 1 and 2 depicting only the controls and 
instrumentation systems, specific strategies are summarized as 
follows: 
The Central Computer system shown in Fig. 1 should have 
both a 1/N redundancy of processors plus the ability to re-
route traffic if a failure occurs.  
A second level of 1/N redundancy should be incorporated 
in the form of a complete identically configured crate or shelf. 
The remote Shelf Nodes shown in Fig.2 could be connected 
with a second link to nearest neighbors for backup. However 
if a shelf fails it would be best to include a completely redun-
dant shelf as well. This is not a huge expenditure as there are 
not that many of these sparsely located nodes. A second node 
would also be useful to maintain communication with critical 
sector safety systems for both machine and personnel.  
The design of front-end modules could also include 1/n re-
dundancy internally in terms of the number o channels. To 
make this effective would require a re-routing system at the 
inputs for the analog signals. In some cases this is simple and 
in some cases problematical due to compromised noise per-
formance. However, slightly compromised noise performance 
in a critical application is far preferable to a loss of mission 
operations. 
 
Some commercial implementations are illustrated in Figs. 
4-5. For the Central Processor application, the new Advanced 
Telecommunications Computer Architecture commercial 
package, ATCA, is a strong candidate. This standard, released 
in June 2004, was designed specifically for High Availability 
with a typical system goal of A=0.99999. This is the kind of 
figure that is need for a typical subsystem of a large machine 
or detector with 10-15 subsystems to obtain an overall ILC 
Availability of A>/=0.99 or 99% up time (Fig. 3). The strate-
gies include intelligent management of the crate or shelf by 
automatically rerouting traffic around a failed channel, power-
ing down a failed board so it can be removed and replaced 
while the remaining system keeps operating, and sensing of 
fan airflow and temperatures and controlling fan speeds to 
compensate for a failed fan. Its main shortcoming is that crate 
temperatures can get unacceptably high for experimental ap-
plications where the hardware is not easily accessible, or is 
totally inaccessible during long periods of running, such as 
inside an accelerator tunnel or detector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. ATCA Shelf (Crate) Features 
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Fig. 5. ATCA Shelf Rear Features 
 
 
The Front End Stand-Alone Card system concept is shown 
in more detail in Fig. 6. Here we visualize a dual 48V (e.g.) 
power bus system running the length of a machine sector, 
upon which cards can be placed either singly or in groups as 
the situation dictates. The idea is to minimize cable runs from 
the sensors. The card has all connectors for signals, power and 
cooling on the bottom side so the module can be machine-
manipulated if desired for removal and replacement with the 
machine running. Communication is by dual serial bus, fiber if 
there is no radiation and wire or wireless if there is radiation 
that would degrade fiber. The electronics itself needs to be 
protected from neutrons and gammas so concrete shielding is 
visualized. Timing is also provided if the needed precision is 1 
nanosecond or less. All timing and data go to the Sector Hub. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Front End Stand Alone Card Concept 
 
VI. NEW POWER SYSTEMS DIAGNOSTIC CONTROLLER 
In addition to the HA strategies embodied above, a new 
strategy is proposed, namely to add a special diagnostic con-
troller into every power unit, such as a modulator or large 
power supply. Moreover it is proposed to use a modular archi-
tecture for all such devices in order to employ a 1/n redun-
dancy strategy at the unit level. Like the ATCA system, the 
modules of critical power supplies that would interrupt the 
machine if they failed would be hot swappable.  With this 
approach, it is easily shown that a power supply subsystem of 
1000 supplies can obtain the needed Subsystem Availability 
of >0.9999 to obtain an overall machine Availability of > 
0.99,as shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Modular 4/5 Redundant HA Power Supply with 
Embedded Diagnostic Controller 
 
With the basic strategies outlined, extremely high subsys-
tem Availability can be obtained without the necessity of un-
realistically high Reliability of the basic components. Choices 
can be made between these two when engineering the Subsys-
tems. Another example of a very important component is 
shown in Figure 8. This is a new style Klystron Modulator 
called a Marx bank, in which identical cells are stacked to 
provide the total voltage and current needed for an ILC 
10MW pulsed tube. The important feature of this design is 
that a very small number of extra cells can yield an HA design 
that meets all the requirements of Subsystem Availability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. HA Marx Bank Modulator for ILC 
In addition to HA architecture, this transformer-less unit 
has the advantages of smaller size, air cooling, higher effi-
ciency, reduced size and weight, and reduced operating cost.  
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VII.  SUMMARY OF HA MACHINE DESIGN 
   To obtain High Availability of an accelerator, all subsys-
tems must adopt an HA architecture featuring modular unit 
design, redundancy, and hot swap capability for any single 
unit that is mission-critical to the machine.  With foresight and 
investment in the basic components, it is reasonable to expect 
performance near A=1 from a machine of any size, insofar as 
its electronics and power systems are concerned. In the case of 
accelerators, the enormous cost of a crippled production ma-
chine easily justifies HA design strategies at the beginning of 
a new project. 
VIII. SMART STANDARDS AND HA ACCELERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN 
Instrumentation standards are an extremely important factor 
in engineering large projects. Custom designs of basic com-
ponents such as modules, crates or power systems should be 
considered only when unavoidable. The long-term cost of 
maintaining individually engineered units where unnecessary 
leads to inefficient operation and loss of production. Instru-
mentation standards have serve well in physics research in the 
past but have been allowed to become obsolete as technology 
moved on.2 It is now time to reconsider a set of standards that 
support HA design in large systems like the ILC and its detec-
tors. At the same time, a broad collaboration should undertake 
this work so that industrial support is viable and so that many 
research users can benefit.  This requires careful choices. 
A common error in standardization is to become over-
prescriptive and thus lock in technologies that are bound for 
obsolescence. This can be avoided by recognizing a primary 
and a secondary level of standard, on quite prescriptive and 
the other allowing options so the standard can flow with tech-
nology and extend its lifetime accordingly. SMART standards 
need to be developed with the following goals: 
1. A professionally engineered, commercially available, 
inexpensive platform and toolkit 
2. Able to accommodate technology change without los-
ing functionality 
3. Not over- or under-specified to inhibit designers 
4. Primary Needs 
a. Power system, connectors & communications 
architecture 
5. Secondary Needs 
a. Form factor and protocols 
 
The areas we have identified for standards in accelerators 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. An HA ATCA-like redundant Backbone for Central Farm, 
Sector hubs/ concentrators 
2. An ATCA-like redundant communications, fast timing and 
mechanics for stand-alone FE cards. Fast data and timing need 
wire or fiber; slow data may be wireless. 
3. A Redundant power system at crate level and a similar dis-
tributed system in tunnels 
 
2 Ibid, R. Larsen & R. Downing. 
4. Protocols, with type and speeds chosen to suit the applica-
tion 
IX. STANDARDS IN LARGE DETECTOR DESIGN  
Modern large detector design appears to defy standardization 
but that is because this aspect has been neglected for the last 
decade or more. There are two primary areas inside detectors 
where standards can and should be applied: 
1.An ATCA-like redundant communications backbone, 
minimized in size as needed for application. 
2. A. small intelligent card containing FPGA subset that can 
drop into custom hubs deep inside detector.  This may have to 
be radiation hardened. The link may be wire, fiber or wireless. 
3. A Primary dual power distribution system, e.g. 48V for 
lower currents, and 
4. A Secondary dual power converter system to serve inter-
nal nodes for groups of Front End cards, accessible for re-
placement without opening the detector.  Hot swappable com-
ponents may also be a consideration even though detectors are 
not normally accessible while running. 
X. CONCUDING REMARKS:  CCOLLABORATION  
Both the ILC project, should it become reality, and the de-
velopment of standards will need strong international collabo-
ration Not everyone will participate in the ILC which, al-
though an important initiative that helps define the issues, .is 
only one part of the standardization needs being discussed. 
The standardization goals are more imminent and should be 
pursued by a broad community that will derive enormous mu-
tual benefit from their efforts.  
A revived standards program should be pursued vigorously 
as a community goal worthy of investment irrespective of the 
fate of any single large project. 
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